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Excerpts from Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012) 
 
Prepared by Wilson Huhn 
 
 
Introduction to the Opinion 
 
2. [Placing the debate over national universal health care coverage in a broader context.] 
 
In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States 
and the people retain the remainder. Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed 
that “the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” to the Federal 
Government “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system 
shall exist.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819). In this case we must again 
determine whether the Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many 
States and individuals believe it does not possess. Resolving this controversy requires us to 
examine both the limits of the Government’s power, and our own limited role in policing those 
boundaries. 
 
5. [Describing the broad power of Congress to tax and spend.] 
 
Put simply, Congress may tax and spend. This grant gives the Federal Government 
considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate. The Federal Government 
may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control. 
 
6. [Expressing the principle that the Court’s powers are limited.] 
 
Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess 
neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted 
to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. 
It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices. 
 
Part II (ruling that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply) 
 
11-12. [Explaining that if the individual mandate constitutes a “tax” within the meaning of 
the Anti-Injunction Act, this lawsuit would have to be postponed until the year 2014.] 
 
Before turning to the merits, we need to be sure we have the authority to do so. The Anti-
Injunction Act provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any 
tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against 
whom such tax was assessed.” 26 U. S. C. §7421(a). This statute protects the Government’s ability to 
collect a consistent stream of revenue, by barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the 
collection of taxes. Because of the Anti-Injunction Act, taxes can ordinarily be challenged only after 
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they are paid, by suing for a refund. See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nav. Co., 370 U. S. 1, 7–8 
(1962). 
 
The penalty for not complying with the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate first becomes 
enforceable in 2014. The present challenge to the mandate thus seeks to restrain the penalty’s future 
collection. Amicus [appointed counsel] contends that the Internal Revenue Code treats the penalty as a 
tax, and that the Anti-Injunction Act therefore bars this suit.  
 
12. [Rebutting the argument of appointed counsel that the enforcement mechanism for the 
individual mandate is a “tax” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.] 
 
Amicus contends that the Internal Revenue Code treats the penalty as a tax, and that the 
Anti-Injunction Act therefore bars this suit.  
 
The text of the pertinent statutes suggests otherwise. The Anti-Injunction Act applies to 
suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” §7421(a) (emphasis 
added). Congress, however, chose to describe the “[s]hared responsibility payment” imposed on 
those who forgo health insurance not as a “tax,” but as a “penalty.” §§5000A(b), (g)(2). There is 
no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to “any tax” would apply to a “penalty.” 
 
Congress’s decision to label this exaction a “penalty” rather than a “tax” is significant 
because the Affordable Care Act describes many other exactions it creates as “taxes.” 
 
[However] … Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for 
constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or the other. 
 
13. [In the interpretation of the interaction between the Affordable Care Act and the Anti-
Injunction Act, the text of the law is the “best evidence” of Congress’ intent.] 
 
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, however, are creatures of Congress’s own 
creation. How they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best evidence of Congress’s 
intent is the statutory text. 
 
Part III-A (ruling that the individual mandate is not constitutional  
under the Commerce Clause 
 
18. [textual argument against the individual mandate as an exercise of the Commerce 
Power] 
 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3 (emphasis 
added). The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be 
regulated. If the power to “regulate” something included the power to create it, many of the provisions in 
the Constitution would be superfluous. For example, the Constitution gives Congress the power to “coin 
Money,” in addition to the power to “regulate the Value thereof.” Id., cl. 5. And it gives Congress the 
power to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” in addition to the power to 
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Id., cls. 12–14. If the 
power to regulate the armed forces or the value of money included the power to bring the subject of the 
3 
 
regulation into existence, the specific grant of such powers would have been unnecessary. The language 
of the Constitution reflects the natural understanding that the power to regulate assumes there is already 
something to be regulated. 
 
19-20. [Longstanding precedent speaks of Congress’ power to regulate “economic activity”] 
 
Our precedent also reflects this understanding. As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the 
commerce power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as 
reaching “activity.” It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting them. See, e.g., Lopez, supra, 
at 560 (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that 
activity will be sustained”); Perez, 402 U. S., at 154 (“Where the class of activities is regulated and that 
class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual 
instances of the class” (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)); Wickard, supra, at 125 
(“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, 
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937) (“Although activities may be 
intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens 
and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control”). 
20-21. [Finding that the individual mandate does not regulate commercial activity but 
rather requires individuals to engage in economic activity, and finding that upholding this 
law would greatly expand the power of Congress.] 
 
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead 
compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their 
failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to 
regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast do-
main to congressional authority. Every day individuals do not do an infinite number of things. In some 
cases they decide not to do something; in others they simply fail to do it. Allowing Congress to justify 
federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an 
individual could potentially make within the scope of federal regulation, and—under the Government’s 
theory—empower Congress to make those decisions for him. 
 
23-24. [Continuing the policy argument against allowing Congress the power to require individuals 
to engage in economic activity.] 
 
People, for reasons of their own, often fail to do things that would be good for them or good for 
society. Those failures—joined with the similar failures of others—can readily have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce. Under the Government’s logic, that authorizes Congress to use its commerce 
power to compel citizens to act as the Government would have them act.  
 
That is not the country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned. … Accepting the 
Government’s theory would give Congress the same license to regulate what we do not do, fundamentally 
changing the relation between the citizen and the Federal government. 
 
24. [Intent and tradition arguments against the constitutionality of the individual mandate under 
the Commerce Clause.] 
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To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity; both have 
measurable economic effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing something and doing 
nothing would not have been lost on the Framers, who were “practical statesmen,” not metaphysical 
philosophers. Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 673 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). As we have explained, “the framers of the Constitution 
were not mere visionaries, toying with speculations or theories, but practical men, dealing with the facts 
of political life as they understood them, putting into form the government they were creating, and 
prescribing in language clear and intelligible the powers that government was to take.” South Carolina v. 
United States, 199 U. S. 437, 449 (1905). The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, 
not to compel it, and for over 200 years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected this un-
derstanding. There is no reason to depart from that understanding now. 
 
26. [Finding that the individual mandate regulates individuals, not economic activity.] 
 
Everyone will likely participate in the markets for food, clothing, transportation, shelter, or 
energy; that does not authorize Congress to direct them to purchase particular products in those or other 
markets today. The Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from cradle to 
grave, simply because he will predictably engage in particular transactions. Any police power to regulate 
individuals as such, as opposed to their activities, remains vested in the States. 
 
28-29. [Ruling that the individual mandate is not constitutional under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.] 
 
As our jurisprudence under the Necessary and Proper Clause has developed, we have been very 
deferential to Congress’s determination that a regulation is “necessary.” We have thus upheld laws that 
are “‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’” Comstock, 560 U. S., 
at ___ (slip op., at 5) (quoting McCulloch, supra, at 413, 418). But we have also carried out our 
responsibility to declare unconstitutional those laws that undermine the structure of government 
established by the Constitution. Such laws, which are not “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution,” McCulloch, supra, at 421, are not “proper [means] for carrying into Execution” Congress’s 
enumerated powers. Rather, they are, “in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely acts of usurpation’ which 
‘deserve to be treated as such.’” Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 924 (1997) (alterations omitted) 
(quoting The Federalist No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton)); see also New York, 505 U. S., at 177; Comstock, 
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is of fundamental importance to 
consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause . . .”). 
 
Applying these principles, the individual mandate cannot be sustained under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as an essential component of the insurance reforms. Each of our prior cases upholding laws 
under that Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. For 
example, we have upheld provisions permitting continued confinement of those already in federal 
custody when they could not be safely released, Comstock, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 1–2); criminalizing 
bribes involving organizations receiving federal funds, Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 602, 605 
(2004); and tolling state statutes of limitations while cases are pending in federal court, Jinks v. Richland 
County, 538 U. S. 456, 459, 462 (2003). The individual mandate, by contrast, vests Congress with the 
extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power. 
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30. [Conclusion regarding the constitutionality of the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
 
Just as the individual mandate cannot be sustained as a law regulating the substantial effects of 
the failure to purchase health insurance, neither can it be upheld as a “necessary and proper” component 
of the insurance reforms. The commerce power thus does not authorize the mandate. Accord, post, at 4–
16 (joint opinion of SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., dissenting). 
 
Part III-B (framing the issue  
under the General Welfare Clause) 
 
31. [Explaining that the courts have the duty to construe a statute so as to be constitutional, 
if that is “fairly possible.”] 
 
The text of a statute can sometimes have more than one possible meaning. To take a 
familiar example, a law that reads “no vehicles in the park” might, or might not, ban bicycles in 
the park. And it is well established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which 
violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so. Justice Story said 
that 180 years ago: “No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it unavoidable, to give a 
construction to it which should involve a violation, however unintentional, of the constitution.” 
Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448–449 (1830). Justice Holmes made the same point a century 
later: “[T]he rule is settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of 
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which 
will save the Act.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (concurring opinion). 
 
The most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to 
purchase insurance. [But this “command” is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.] … 
Under our precedent, it is therefore necessary to ask whether the Government’s alternative 
reading of the statute—that it only imposes a tax on those without insurance—is a reasonable 
one.  
 
Under the mandate, if an individual does not maintain health insurance, the only 
consequence is that he must make an additional payment to the IRS when he pays his taxes. See 
§5000A(b). That, according to the Government, means the mandate can be regarded as 
establishing a condition—not owning health insurance—that triggers a tax—the required 
payment to the IRS. Under that theory, the mandate is not a legal command to buy insurance. 
Rather, it makes going without insurance just another thing the Government taxes, like buying 
gasoline or earning income. And if the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain taxpayers 
who do not have health insurance, it may be within Congress’s constitutional power to tax. 
 
The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of the mandate, but 
only whether it is a “fairly possible” one. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). As we 
have explained, “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute 
from unconstitutionality.” Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895). The Government 
asks us to interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitution. 
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Granting the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes, it can be so read, for the 
reasons set forth below. 
 
Part III-C (upholding the individual mandate  
under the General Welfare Clause) 
 
33. [Explaining why the enforcement mechanism for the individual mandate “looks like a 
tax,” and stating that the label attached to the provision is not determinative.] 
 
The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without health insurance looks 
like a tax in many respects. The “[s]hared responsibility payment,” as the statute entitles it, is 
paid into the Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file their tax returns. 26 U. S. C. §5000A(b). It 
does not apply to individuals who do not pay federal income taxes because their household 
income is less than the filing threshold in the Internal Revenue Code. §5000A(e)(2). For 
taxpayers who do owe the payment, its amount is determined by such familiar factors as taxable 
income, number of dependents, and joint filing status. §§5000A(b)(3), (c)(2), (c)(4). The 
requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue Code and enforced by the IRS, which—as 
we previously explained—must assess and collect it “in the same manner as taxes.” Supra, at 
13–14. This process yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least some revenue for 
the Government. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 28, n. 4 (1953). Indeed, the payment is 
expected to raise about $4 billion per year by 2017. Congressional Budget Office, Payments of 
Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Apr. 30, 
2010), in Selected CBO Publications Related to Health Care Legislation,2009–2010, p. 71 (rev. 
2010). It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a “penalty,” not a “tax.” But 
while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act, supra, at 12–13, it does not 
determine whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power. It is 
up to Congress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes 
sense to be guided by Congress’s choice of label on that question. That choice does not, 
however, control whether an exaction is within Congress’s constitutional power to tax. 
 
35-36. [Describing the “functional approach” used in prior cases to determine whether a 
statute constitutes a “tax” or a “penalty,” and explaining why the enforcement mechanism 
of the individual mandate functions as a tax.] 
 
Our cases confirm this functional approach. For example, in Drexel Furniture, we 
focused on three practical characteristics of the so-called tax on employing child laborers that 
convinced us the “tax” was actually a penalty. First, the tax imposed an exceedingly heavy bur-
den—10 percent of a company’s net income—on those who employed children, no matter how 
small their infraction. Second, it imposed that exaction only on those who knowingly employed 
underage laborers. Such scienter requirements are typical of punitive statutes, because Congress 
often wishes to punish only those who intentionally break the law. Third, this “tax” was enforced 
in part by the Department of Labor, an agency responsible for punishing violations of labor laws, 
not collecting revenue. 259 U. S., at 36–37; see also, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S., at 780–782 
(considering, inter alia, the amount of the exaction, and the fact that it was imposed for violation 
of a separate criminal law); Constantine, supra, at 295 (same). 
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The same analysis here suggests that the shared responsibility payment may for 
constitutional purposes be considered a tax, not a penalty: First, for most Americans the amount 
due will be far less than the price of insurance, and, by statute, it can never be more.
 
It may often 
be a reasonable financial decision to make the payment rather than purchase insurance, unlike 
the “prohibitory” financial punishment in Drexel Furniture. 259 U. S., at 37. Second, the 
individual mandate contains no scienter requirement. Third, the payment is collected solely by 
the IRS through the normal means of taxation—except that the Service is not allowed to use 
those means most suggestive of a punitive sanction, such as criminal prosecution. See 
§5000A(g)(2). The reasons the Court in Drexel Furniture held that what was called a “tax” there 
was a penalty support the conclusion that what is called a “penalty” here may be viewed as a tax.
  
 
36-37. [Rebutting the argument that this is a “penalty” rather than a “tax” because it seeks 
to influence conduct.] 
 
But taxes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new. Some of our earliest federal 
taxes sought to deter the purchase of imported manufactured goods in order to foster the growth 
of domestic industry. See W. Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America 22 (2d ed. 2004); cf. 2 J. 
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §962, p. 434 (1833) (“the taxing 
power is often, very often, applied for other purposes, than revenue”). Today, federal and state 
taxes can compose more than half the retail price of cigarettes not  just to raise more money, but 
to encourage people to quit smoking. And we have upheld such obviously regulatory measures 
as taxes on selling marijuana and sawed-off shotguns. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 
42, 44– 45 (1950); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 513 (1937). Indeed, “[e]very tax is 
in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity 
taxed as compared with others not taxed.” Sonzinsky, supra, at 513. That §5000A seeks to shape 
decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not mean that it cannot be a valid exercise 
of the taxing power. 
 
37-38. [Arguing that the individual mandate is not a penalty for violating the law but 
simply a tax.] 
 
While the individual mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of health insurance, it 
need not be read to declare that failing to do so is unlawful. Neither the Act nor any other law 
attaches negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment 
to the IRS. The Government agrees with that reading, confirming that if someone chooses to pay 
rather than obtain health insurance, they have fully complied with the law. Brief for United 
States 60–61; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49–50 (Mar. 26, 2012). 
 
Indeed, it is estimated that four million people each year will choose to pay the IRS rather 
than buy insurance. See Congressional Budget Office, supra, at 71. We would expect Congress 
to be troubled by that prospect if such conduct were unlawful. That Congress apparently regards 
such extensive failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not 
think it was creating four million outlaws. It suggests instead that the shared responsibility 
payment merely imposes a tax citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health 
insurance. 
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39. [Rejecting the argument that the “label” that Congress placed upon the law calling the 
enforcement mechanism for the individual mandate a “penalty” instead of a “tax” is 
controlling for constitutional purposes, and rebutting the dissent’s argument that the 
Court is “rewriting” the legislation.] 
 
The joint dissenters argue that we cannot uphold §5000A as a tax because Congress did 
not “frame” it as such. Post, at 17. In effect, they contend that even if the Constitution permits 
Congress to do exactly what we interpret this statute to do, the law must be struck down because 
Congress used the wrong labels. An example may help illustrate why labels should not control 
here. Suppose Congress enacted a statute providing that every taxpayer who owns a house 
without energy efficient windows must pay $50 to the IRS. The amount due is adjusted based on 
factors such as taxable income and joint filing status, and is paid along with the taxpayer’s 
income tax return. Those whose income is below the filing threshold need not pay. The required 
payment is not called a “tax,” a “penalty,” or anything else. No one would doubt that this law 
imposed a tax, and was within Congress’s power to tax. That conclusion should not change 
simply because Congress used the word “penalty” to describe the payment. Interpreting such a 
law to be a tax would hardly “[i]mpos[e] a tax through judicial legislation.” Post, at 25. Rather, it 
would give practical effect to the Legislature’s enactment.  
 
41. [Rejecting the argument that the individual mandate imposes a “direct tax” in violation 
of the Constitution’s requirement that direct taxes be apportioned among the states.] 
 
A tax on going without health insurance does not fall within any recognized category of 
direct tax. It is not a capitation. Capitations are taxes paid by every person, “without regard to 
property, profession, or any other circumstance.” Hylton, supra, at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.) 
(emphasis altered). The whole point of the shared responsibility payment is that it is triggered by 
specific circumstances—earning a certain amount of income but not obtaining health insurance. 
The payment is also plainly not a tax on the ownership of land or personal property. The shared 
responsibility payment is thus not a direct tax that must be apportioned among the several States.   
 
43-44. [Explaining why the power to tax is narrower than the power to regulate, and why 
this law is a “tax” and not a “penalty.”] 
 
… [A]lthough the breadth of Congress’s power to tax is greater than its power to regulate 
commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of control over individual 
behavior. Once we recognize that Congress may regulate a particular decision under the Com-
merce Clause, the Federal Government can bring its full weight to bear. Congress may simply 
command individuals to do as it directs. An individual who disobeys may be subjected to 
criminal sanctions. Those sanctions can include not only fines and imprisonment, but all the at-
tendant consequences of being branded a criminal: deprivation of otherwise protected civil 
rights, such as the right to bear arms or vote in elections; loss of employment opportunities; 
social stigma; and severe disabilities in other controversies, such as custody or immigration 
disputes.  
 
By contrast, Congress’s authority under the taxing power is limited to requiring an 
individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no more. If a tax is properly paid, the 
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Government has no power to compel or punish individuals subject to it. We do not make light of 
the severe burden that taxation—especially taxation motivated by a regulatory purpose—can 
impose. But imposition of a tax nonetheless leaves an individual with a lawful choice to do or 
not do a certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on that choice. 
 
Part III-D (stating the conclusion upholding  
the constitutionality of the individual mandate 
 
44-45. [Chief Justice Roberts’ conclusion regarding the individual mandate.] 
 
The Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy health 
insurance. Section 5000A would therefore be unconstitutional if read as a command. The Federal 
Government does have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance. Section 
5000A is therefore constitutional, because it can reasonably be read as a tax. 
 
Part IV (upholding the expansion of the Medicaid program but striking 
down the power of the federal government to withhold funding for the 
existing Medicaid program for any State that refuses to participate in the 
Medicaid expansion) 
 
46-47. [Describing Congress’ power under the General Welfare Clause and the limits upon 
that power to coerce the States.] 
 
The Spending Clause grants Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . 
. general Welfare of the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 1. We have long recognized 
that Congress may use this power to grant federal funds to the States, and may condition such a 
grant upon the States’ “taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take.” 
College Savings Bank, 527 U. S., at 686. Such measures “encourage a State to regulate in a 
particular way, [and] influenc[e] a State’s policy choices.” New York, supra, at 166. The con-
ditions imposed by Congress ensure that the funds are used by the States to “provide for the . . . 
general Welfare” in the manner Congress intended. 
 
At the same time, our cases have recognized limits on Congress’s power under the 
Spending Clause to secure state compliance with federal objectives. “We have repeatedly 
characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract.’” Barnes v. 
Gorman, 536 U. S. 181, 186 (2002) (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 
451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981)). The legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the spending power “thus rests 
on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’” Pennhurst, 
supra, at 17. Respecting this limitation is critical to ensuring that Spending Clause legislation 
does not undermine the status of the States as independent sovereigns in our federal system. That 
system “rests on what might at first seem a counterintuitive insight, that ‘freedom is enhanced by 
the creation of two governments, not one.’ ” Bond, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quoting 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 758 (1999)). For this reason, “the Constitution has never been 
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Con-
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gress’ instructions.” New York, supra, at 162. Otherwise the two-government system established 
by the Framers would give way to a system that vests power in one central government, and 
individual liberty would suffer.  
 
That insight has led this Court to strike down federal legislation that commandeers a 
State’s legislative or administrative apparatus for federal purposes. … Congress may use its 
spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies. But 
when “pressure turns into compulsion,” ibid., the legislation runs contrary to our system of 
federalism. 
 
48. [Stating the principle that the federal government may not “force the states to 
implement a federal program.”] 
 
Permitting the Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal program 
would threaten the political accountability key to our federal system. 
 
49. [Stating that, on the other hand, if the States wish to operate as “separate and 
independent sovereigns,” then “they have to act like it.”] 
 
As our decision in Steward Machine confirms, Congress may attach appropriate 
conditions to federal taxing and spending programs to preserve its control over the use of federal 
funds. In the typical case we look to the States to defend their prerogatives by adopting “the 
simple expedient of not yielding” to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace the 
federal policies as their own. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 482 (1923). The States are 
separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act like it. 
 
50. [Articulating the general standard used to determine whether or not a conditional 
spending program is coercive against the States.] 
 
We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of funds on the States’ 
complying with restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is the means by which 
Congress ensures that the funds are spent according to its view of the “general Welfare.” 
Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that 
basis. When, for example, such conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant 
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to 
accept policy changes. 
 
52-53 [Contending that the Medicaid expansion contained in the ACA is a separate and 
different program than existing Medicaid.] 
 
JUSTICE GINSBURG claims that Dole is distinguishable because here “Congress has 
not threatened to withhold funds earmarked for any other program.” Post, at 47. But that begs the 
question: The States contend that the expansion is in reality a new program and that Congress is 
forcing them to accept it by threatening the funds for the existing Medicaid program. We cannot 
agree that existing Medicaid and the expansion dictated by the Affordable Care Act are all one 
program simply because “Congress styled” them as such. Post, at 49. If the expansion is not 
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properly viewed as a modification of the existing Medicaid program, Congress’s decision to so 
title it is irrelevant.
 
 
 
Here, the Government claims that the Medicaid expansion is properly viewed merely as a 
modification of the existing program because the States agreed that Congress could change the 
terms of Medicaid when they signed on in the first place. The Government observes that the 
Social Security Act, which includes the original Medicaid provisions, contains a clause expressly 
reserving “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of that statute. 42 U. S. C. §1304. 
So it does. But “if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must 
do so unambiguously.” Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17. A State confronted with statutory language 
reserving the right to “alter” or “amend” the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act 
might reasonably assume that Congress was entitled to make adjustments to the Medicaid 
program as it developed. Congress has in fact done so, sometimes conditioning only the new 
funding, other times both old and new. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 
1381–1382, 1465 (extending Medicaid eligibility, but partly conditioning only the new funding); 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, §4601, 104 Stat. 1388–166 (extending eligibility, 
and conditioning old and new funds).  
 
The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree. The 
original program was designed to cover medical services for four particular categories of the 
needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent children. See 42 U. 
S. C. §1396a(a)(10). Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered and expanded 
the boundaries of these categories. Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into 
a program to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below 
133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but 
rather an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance 
coverage.
 
 
 
Indeed, the manner in which the expansion is structured indicates that while Congress 
may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it recognized it was 
enlisting the States in a new health care program. Congress created a separate funding provision 
to cover the costs of providing services to any person made newly eligible by the expansion. 
While Congress pays 50 to 83 percent of the costs of covering individuals currently enrolled in 
Medicaid, §1396d(b), once the expansion is fully implemented Congress will pay 90 percent of 
the costs for newly eligible persons, §1396d(y)(1). The conditions on use of the different funds 
are also distinct. Congress mandated that newly eligible persons receive a level of coverage that 
is less comprehensive than the traditional Medicaid benefit package.  
 
55. [Ruling on the constitutionality of Medicaid expansion and the right of the federal 
government to withhold new funding from States that choose not to participate in the new 
program.] 
 
Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable 
Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds 
comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that 
choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding. 
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56. [Ruling on constitutionality of Medicaid expansion, continued.] 
 
Today’s holding does not affect the continued application of §1396c to the existing 
Medicaid program. Nor does it affect the Secretary’s ability to withdraw funds provided under 
the Affordable Care Act if a State that has chosen to participate in the expansion fails to comply 
with the requirements of that Act. 
 
57-58. [Ruling on “severability” upholding the remainder of the ACA.] 
 
We are confident that Congress would have wanted to preserve the rest of the Act. It is 
fair to say that Congress assumed that every State would participate in the Medicaid expansion, 
given that States had no real choice but to do so. The States contend that Congress enacted the 
rest of the Act with such full participation in mind; they point out that Congress made Medicaid 
a means for satisfying the mandate, 26 U. S. C. §5000A(f)(1)(A)(ii), and enacted no other plan 
for providing coverage to many low-income individuals. According to the States, this means that 
the entire Act must fall.  
 
We disagree. The Court today limits the financial pressure the Secretary may apply to 
induce States to accept the terms of the Medicaid expansion. As a practical matter, that means 
States may now choose to reject the expansion; that is the whole point. But that does not mean 
all or even any will. Some States may indeed decline to participate, either because they are 
unsure they will be able to afford their share of the new funding obligations, or because they are 
unwilling to commit the administrative resources necessary to support the expansion. Other 
States, however, may voluntarily sign up, finding the idea of expanding Medicaid coverage 
attractive, particularly given the level of federal funding the Act offers at the outset.  
 
We have no way of knowing how many States will accept the terms of the expansion, but 
we do not believe Congress would have wanted the whole Act to fall, simply because some may 
choose not to participate. The other reforms Congress enacted, after all, will remain “fully 
operative as a law,” Champlin, supra, at 234, and will still function in a way “consistent with 
Congress’ basic objectives in enacting the statute,” Booker, supra, at 259. Confident that 
Congress would not have intended anything different, we conclude that the rest of the Act need 
not fall in light of our constitutional holding. 
 
58-59 [Conclusion] 
 
The Affordable Care Act is constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part. The 
individual mandate cannot be upheld as an exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause. That Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order 
individuals to engage in it. In this case, however, it is reasonable to construe what Congress has 
done as increasing taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to go without 
health insurance. Such legislation is within Congress’s power to tax. As for the Medicaid 
expansion, that portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the Constitution by threatening 
existing Medicaid funding. Congress has no authority to order the States to regulate according to 
its instructions. Congress may offer the States grants and require the States to comply with 
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accompanying conditions, but the States must have a genuine choice whether to accept the offer. 
The States are given no such choice in this case: They must either accept a basic change in the 
nature of Medicaid, or risk losing all Medicaid funding. The remedy for that constitutional 
violation is to preclude the Federal Government from imposing such a sanction. That remedy 
does not require striking down other portions of the Affordable Care Act.  
 
The Framers created a Federal Government of limited powers, and assigned to this Court 
the duty of enforcing those limits. The Court does so today. But the Court does not express any 
opinion on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution, that judgment is re-
served to the people. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.  
 
It is so ordered. 
